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Abstract
An important missing link in the construction of secure systems is ﬁnding a practical way to establish a
correspondence between a software speciﬁcation and its implementation. We address this problem for the
case of crypto-based Java implementations (such as crypto protocols) with an approach using automated
theorem provers for ﬁrst-order logic, by linking the implementation to a speciﬁcation model. In this paper,
we present details on an application of this approach to the open-source Java implementation Jessie of the
SSL protocol. We also shortly comment on how these results can be transferred to the standard Java Secure
Sockets Extension (JSSE) library that was recently open-sourced by Sun.
Keywords: Automated security veriﬁcation, crypto protocol implementations, Java Secure Sockets
Extension (JSSE)
1 Introduction
Many security incidents at the software level have been reported, sometimes with
potentially quite severe consequences. Any support to aid secure systems develop-
ment is thus dearly needed. With respect to crypto-based software (such as crypto
protocols or software using cryptographic signatures), a lot of very successful work
has been done to formally analyze abstract speciﬁcations of these protocols for se-
curity design weaknesses, including [14,15,1,16] (cf. [18,10] for overviews). More
recently, there has been some work towards verifying implementations of security-
critical software in general [8], and also in particular of crypto protocols [13,7,12,4].
While the approaches reported in [7,4,6] aim to verify implementations written by
the research groups themselves (and [8] does not address crypto protocols), the line
1 http://www.jurjens.de/jan . This work was partially funded by the Royal Society within the project
Modelbased Formal Security Analysis of Crypto Protocol Implementations.
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of work reported in the current paper (which was started in [13,12]) is targeted to
legacy implementations of crypto protocols. It is motivated by the fact that so far,
crypto-based software is usually not generated automatically from formal speciﬁ-
cations, or even created in ways under control of the security analyst. Thus, even
where the corresponding speciﬁcations are formally veriﬁed, the implementations
may still contain vulnerabilities related to the insecure use of cryptographic algo-
rithms. An example for a crypto protocol whose design had been formally veriﬁed
for security and whose implementation was later found to contain a weakness with
respect to its use of cryptographic algorithms can be found in [17].
The current paper uses an approach for analyzing crypto-based implementations
for security requirements using automated theorem provers (ATPs) for ﬁrst-order
logic (FOL), which is based on earlier work reported in [11]. Security requirements
can be formalized straightforwardly in FOL, and the ATPs oﬀer eﬃcient derivation
algorithms. The Java code is linked to a speciﬁcation model in which the crypto-
graphic operations are represented as abstract functions, and which is translated to
formulas in FOL with equality. Together with a logical formalization of the security
requirements, they are then given as input into any ATP supporting the TPTP
input notation (which is a standard for formulating FOL formulas for ATPs), such
as e-SETHEO [19] or SPASS [20]. The approach supports a modular security anal-
ysis by using assertions in the source code. Where a veriﬁcation fails because the
implementation contains a security ﬂaw, one can use a Prolog engine to generate
the corresponding attack trace.
Our goal is not to provide a full formal veriﬁcation of Java code but to increase
understanding of the security properties enforced by crypto protocol implementa-
tions in a way which is as automated as possible. For the moment, we assume that
the cryptographic algorithms called in the crypto protocol implementations have
been implemented correctly (and our goal is to verify that they are used correctly
in the crypto protocol). Also, because of the abstractions introduced for eﬃciency
reasons (as explained below, for example abstracting from the identity of the sender
of a message), the approach may produce false alarms (which however have not
surfaced yet in practical examples).
The goal of the current paper is to report on an application of the approach to
the open-source Java implementation Jessie of the SSL protocol. We also shortly
indicate how these results can be transferred to the standard Java Secure Sockets
Extension (JSSE) library that was recently open-sourced by Sun.
2 Code Analysis
The analysis approach used here works with the well-known Dolev-Yao adversary
model for security analysis. The idea is that an adversary can read messages sent
over the network and collect them in his knowledge set. The adversary can merge
and extract messages in the knowledge set and can delete or insert messages on the
communication links. The security requirements can then be formalized using this
adversary model. For example, a data value remains secret from the adversary if it
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• enc(E,K) (encryption)
• dec(E,K) (decryption)
• hash(E) (hashing)
• sign(E,K) (signing)
• ver(E,K,E′) (veriﬁcation of signature)
• kgen(E) (key generation)
• inv(E) (inverse key)
• conc(E,E′) (concatenation)
• head(E) and tail(E) (head and tail of concat.)
Fig. 1. a) Tool-ﬂow of the JavaSec suite; b) Abstract crypto operations
never appears in the knowledge set of the adversary.
We explain how to link the Java program to the speciﬁcation model and how
to generate the FOL formulas, which are given as input to the ATP. The corre-
sponding tool-ﬂow is shown in Fig. 1a). Because of space limitations, we can not
explain all steps required for linking the Java code to the speciﬁcation model in
every technical detail. We restrict our explanation to the analysis for secrecy of
data. The idea here is to use a predicate knows which deﬁnes a bound on the
knowledge an adversary may obtain by reading, deleting and inserting messages
on vulnerable communication lines (such as the Internet) in interaction with the
protocol participants. Precisely, knows(E) means that the adversary may get to
know E during the execution of the protocol. For any data value s supposed to
remain conﬁdential, one thus has to check whether one can derive knows(s). From
a logical point of view, this means that one considers a term algebra generated
from data such as variables, keys, nonces and other data using symbolic opera-
tions including the ones in Fig. 1b). There, the symbols E, E′, and K denote
terms inductively constructed in this way. For example, the term ver(E,K,E′)
denotes the boolean value which signiﬁes whether the veriﬁcation of the signa-
ture E against the plain text E′ using the key K is successful. These symbolic
operations are the abstract versions of the cryptographic algorithms deﬁned in
the JavaTM Cryptography Architecture (JCA) [9]. Note that the cryptographic
functions in the JCA are implemented as several methods, including an object
creation and possibly initialization. Relevant for our analysis are the actual cryp-
tographic computations performed by the digest(), sign(), verify(), generatePublic(),
generatePrivate(), nextBytes(), and doFinal() methods (together with the arguments
that are given beforehand, possibly using the update() method), so the others are
essentially abstracted away. Note also that the key and random generation methods
generatePublic(), generatePrivate(), and nextBytes() are not part of the crypto term
algebra in Fig. 1b) but are formalized implicitly in the logical formula by introduc-
ing new constants representing the keys and random values (and making use of the
inv(K) operation in the case of generateKeyPair()). In that term algebra, one deﬁnes
the equations dec(enc(E,K), inv(K)) = E and ver(sign(E, inv(K)),K,E) = true for all
terms E,K, and the usual laws regarding concatenation, head(), and tail() to hold.
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input_formula(construct_message_1,axiom,(
! [E1,E2]: ((knows(E1) & knows(E2))
=> (knows(conc(E1,E2)) & knows(enc(E1,E2)) & knows(sign(E1,E2)))))).
input_formula(construct_message_2,axiom,(
! [E1,E2]: (knows(conc(E1,E2)) => (knows(E1) & knows(E2))))).
Fig. 2. Some general crypto axioms
See [10] for more details on this.
The predicates deﬁned to hold for a given system are deﬁned as follows. For each
publicly known expression E, the statement knows(E) is given. To model the fact
that the adversary may enlarge his set of knowledge by constructing new expressions
from the ones he knows, including the use of cryptographic operations, formulas are
generated for these operations for which some examples are given in Fig. 2. We
use the TPTP notation for the FOL formulas, which is the input notation for many
ATPs including the one we use (e-SETHEO [19]). Here & means logical conjunction
and ![E1,E2] forall-quantiﬁcation over E1, E2.
We explain how a Java program can be linked to a speciﬁcation model which
gives rise to a logical formula characterizing the interaction between the adversary
and the protocol participants (the bottom left part of Fig. 1a). We explain the
translation ﬁrst for a simpliﬁed fragment of Java without loops and concurrency.
Also, to simplify the treatment of variables and their assignment, we ﬁrst use stan-
dard transformations to simplify the translation from the program to logic. They
are necessary, because in programming languages, program variables have state,
while in classical logic variables are stateless.
side eﬀects Side eﬀects from method calls are ﬂattened by traversing into the
method deﬁnition. Where this becomes infeasible, one may add annotations to
the method declaration that abstractly capture the computation of a method
(and its side eﬀects).
static single assignment The program is transformed to the static single assign-
ment (SSA) format as usual.
Below, setting a variable a to a value v will be formalized as the logical constraint
a = v on the models (which any valid model of the axioms will have to fulﬁll, whereby
it amounts to an assignment). Getting the value from the variable a is modeled by
just using that variable. We may ignore variable data deﬁnitions since they are not
necessary in the TPTP input notation for the ATP. Similarly, we can treat variable
initialization as assignment. In the case of local redeﬁnitions of global variables, we
assume a suitable renaming is used to avoid confusion.
To get the FOL formula for the program, we ﬁrst construct the speciﬁcation
model capturing the abstract behaviour of the program. This can for example
be done with the help of tools for generating control ﬂows graphs (such as Code
Logic), or by constructing it manually from the textual speciﬁcation of the protocol.
The model we construct is a state machine with transitions carrying labels of the
form await message e – check condition g – output message e’. A state machine
transition is executed if a message conforming to its input pattern arrives (or if
the input pattern is empty) and if its condition is satisﬁed. When the transition
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Fig. 3. Communication in crypto protocols such as SSL
is executed, its action will be executed and then the next transition in the state
machine evaluated. In the label await message e, the expression e consists of a
message name msg and a list of variables which will be assigned values when a
message with name msg is received over the network. Similarly, an output message
e’ pattern consists of a message name msg and a list of expressions, that are at
run-time evaluated to values which are sent on the network as arguments of the
message msg.
To determine the data sent and received, we ﬁrst deal with the mechanisms
which implement a send or a receipt procedure. We assume that each message is
represented by a message class. It stores the data to be written in the communica-
tion buﬀer. Conversely, this class can also read messages from the communication
buﬀer (this communication principle is visualized in Figure 3). We found that this
mechanism is often (and in particular in the Jessie project discussed in Sect. 3) im-
plemented using methods write() (for sending messages), and read() (for receiving
them). Furthermore, the occurrences of the method write() (resp. read()) which are
called at the class java.io.OutputStream (resp. java.io.InputStream) is used to identify
the individual message parts within the communication procedure in the form of
parameters that are delivered or the assignments made. In more detail, commu-
nication is implemented as follows: With the method call msg.write(dout, version),
the message msg is written into the output buﬀer dout. Each occurrence of such a
method call can be identiﬁed and associated with the abstract function send(msg)
in the speciﬁcation model. The method call dout.ﬂush later ﬂushes the buﬀer. The
assignment msg = Handshake.read reads a message from the buﬀer during the hand-
shake part of the protocol. As an example, the code fragment for initializing and
sending the ClientHello message is given in Figure 4.
Lastly, we map each assignment assgmt of an expression to a variable in Java to a
logical predicate passgmt on the corresponding logical variable. The list of arguments
of the message e may be empty and the condition g equal to true where they are
not needed.
For the mapping from the state machine deﬁned above to a FOL formula, we
map the Boolean expression in Java syntax to logical syntax in the TPTP format,
e.g. by replacing the equality test == by the binary Boolean function equal() and
Fig. 4. Initializing and sending the ClientHello message
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PRED(l) = ∀exp1, . . . , expn.
“
knows(exp1) ∧ . . . ∧ knows(expn) ∧ cond(exp1, . . . , expn)
⇒ knows(exp(exp1 , . . . , expn ) ∧ PRED(l
′)
”
Fig. 5. Transition predicate
similarly for the other Boolean connectives.
Suppose now that we are given a transition l = (source(l), event(l), guard(l),
msg(l), target(l)) with guard(l) ≡ cond(arg1, . . . , argn), and msg(l) ≡ exp(arg1 ,
. . . ,argn), where the parameters arg i of the guard and the message are variables
which store the data values exchanged during the course of the protocol. Suppose
that the transition l′ is the next transition in the state machine. For each such tran-
sition l, we deﬁne a predicate PRED(l) as in Fig. 5. If a next transition l′ does not
exist, PRED(l) is deﬁned by substituting PRED(l′) with true in Fig. 5. The formula
formalizes the fact that, if the adversary knows expressions exp1, . . . , expn validating
the condition cond(exp1, . . . , expn), then he can send them to one of the protocol
participants to receive the message exp(exp1 , . . . , expn ) in exchange, and then the
protocol continues. With this formalization, a data value s is said to be kept secret
if it is not possible to derive knows(s) from the formulas deﬁned by a protocol. To
construct the recursive deﬁnition above, we assume that the state machine is ﬁnite
and cycle-free. The construction can be reﬁned to allow loops (by using inﬁnite
arrays for the variables updated in the loop), recursion, and concurrent threads.
For each object O in the system to be analyzed, this gives a predicate PRED(O) =
PRED(l) where l is the ﬁrst transition in the state machine of O. The axioms in
the overall FOL formula for a given protocol are then the conjunction of the for-
mulas representing the publicly known expressions, the formula in Fig. 2, and the
conjunction of the formulas PRED(O) for each object O in the protocol.
The formulas deﬁned above are written into the TPTP ﬁle as axioms. The
security requirement to be checked is written into the TPTP ﬁle as a conjecture
(for example, knows(secret) in case the secrecy of the value secret is to be checked).
The ATP will then check whether the conjecture is derivable from the axioms. In the
case of secrecy, the result is interpreted as follows: If knows(secret) can be derived
from the axioms, this means that the adversary may potentially get to know secret.
If the ATP returns that it is not possible to derive knows(secret) from the axioms,
this means that the adversary will not get the data represented by secret (relative
to our system and adversary model).
3 The Example Application: The SSL project JESSIE
We apply the approach sketched above to the implementation of the Internet secu-
rity protocol SSL in the project Jessie, which is an open-source implementation of
the Java Secure Sockets Extension (JSSE).
SSL is the de facto standard for securing http connections, which however has
been the source of several signiﬁcant security vulnerabilities in the past [2] and is
therefore an interesting target for a security analysis. In this paper, we concentrate
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Fig. 6. The cryptographic protocol implemented in SSLSocket.java
on the fragment of SSL that uses RSA as the cryptographic algorithm and provides
server authentication (cf. Fig. 6).
The whole Jessie project currently consists of about 5 MB of code, but the part
directly relevant to SSL consists of less than 700 KB in about 70 classes. Therefore
it is challenging, but manageable for formal analysis.
To link the code to the speciﬁcation in Fig. 6, we ﬁrstly explain how important
elements at the model level are implemented at the implementation level. This is
done in the following three steps:
• Step 1: Identiﬁcation of the data transmitted in the send and receipt procedures
at the implementation level.
• Step 2: Interpretation of the transferred data and comparison with the sequence
diagram.
• Step 3: Identiﬁcation and analysis of the cryptographic guards at the implemen-
tation level.
In step 1, the communication at the implementation level is examined and de-
termined how the data that is sent and received can be found in the source code.
Afterwards, in step 2, a meaning is assigned to the data. The interpreted data ele-
ments of the individual messages are then compared with the appropriate elements
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Fig. 7. Data for the Handshake message
in the model. In step 3, it is described how one can identify the guards from the
model in the source code.
Step 1: In our particular protocol, setting up the connection is done by two
methods: doClientHandshake() on the client side and doServerHandshake() on the
server side, which are part of the SSLsocket class in jessie− 1.0.1/org/
metastatic/jessie/provider. After some initializations and parameter checking, both
methods perform the interaction between client and server that is speciﬁed in Fig-
ure 6. Each of the messages is implemented by a class, whose main methods are
called by the doClientHandshake() rp. doServerHandshake() methods. The associated
data is given in Figure 7.
Step 2: In order to be able to make a comparison of the implementation with
the abstract model, we must ﬁrst determine for the individual data how it is im-
plemented on the code level, to then be able to verify that this is done correctly.
We explain this exemplarily for the variable randomBytes written by the method
ClientHello to the message buﬀer. By inspecting the location at which the variable
is written (the method write(randomBytes) in the class Random), we can see that
the value of randomBytes is determined by the second parameter of the constructor
of this class (see Figure 8).
Therefore the contents of the variable depends on the initialization of the cur-
rent random object and thus also on the program state. Thus we need to trace
back the initialization of the object. In the current program state, the random
object was passed on to the ClientHello object by the constructor. This again
was delivered at the initialization of the Handshake object in SSLSocket. doClien-
tHandshake() to the constructor of Handshake. Here (within doClientHandshake()),
we can ﬁnd the initialization of the Random object that was passed on. The
second parameter is generateSeed() of the class SecureRandom from the package
java.security. This call determines the value of randomBytes in the current program
state. Thus the value randomBytes is mapped to the model element RC in the mes-
Fig. 8. Constructor for random
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Fig. 9. Data in ClientHello message
sage ClientHello on the model level. For this, the method java.security.SecureRandom.
generateSeed() must be correctly implemented. To increase our conﬁdence in this
assumption of an agreement of the implementation with the model (although a
full formal veriﬁcation is not the goal of this paper), all data that is sent and re-
ceived must be investigated. In Figure 9, the elements of the message ClientHello
of the model are listed. Here it is shown which data elements of the ﬁrst message
communication are assigned to which elements in the doClientHandshake() method.
As an example, the following assertion for the veriﬁcation of a hash at the client
side in the Jessie doClientHandshake() method is inserted just before the handshake
phase is ﬁnished successfully:
assert
(
Arrays.equals(ﬁnis.getMD5Hash(), verify.getMD5Hash()) &&
Arrays.equals(ﬁnis.getSHAHash(), verify.getSHAHash())
)
Note that the check that the type of the message received is actually correct is
also generated as an assertion as follows, although this is only implicitly contained
in our abstract speciﬁcation.
assert
(
msg.getType() = Handshake.Type.SERVER HELLO
)
Step 3: We now explain at the hand of an example how the guards from the SSL
speciﬁcation in Figure 6 can be identiﬁed on the code level and how it can be checked
that these are in fact correctly implemented. To explain the idea, we concentrate on
the Check Certiﬁcate guard from Figure 6. By manually inspecting the source code,
one can ﬁnd the call of a checkServerTrusted method directly after the point where
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Fig. 10. Call of the checkServerTrusted method
the messages Certiﬁcate and Finished are received, which corresponds to the position
of the
Check Certiﬁcate guard in the model (see Figure 10 for an excerpt of the relevant
program fragment). For the Check Certiﬁcate guard we now explain how one can
establish that it corresponds to the guard ver(certS) on the semantic level and that
it is reached within each program run. The investigation, represented in Figure 11,
shows that ﬁrst the validity of the individual certiﬁcates of the certiﬁcate chain
peerCerts is queried. Subsequently, each certiﬁcate with the key of the predecessor
in the certiﬁcate chain is veriﬁed, until the root is reached. For these it is examined
whether it is referred to by one thrust ancor. If not, a CertiﬁcateException is thrown,
which leads to abort the handshake dialogue. The function doVerify (Signature sig,
PublicKey key) is used for verifying a certiﬁcate.
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Fig. 11. Determine execution of the checkServerTrusted method
We will now explain how the tool automatically veriﬁes, using the annotations
deﬁned above, that the code enforces the checks that have to be performed according
to the protocol speciﬁcation. Again, let p be the program point where a protocol
message is received and q the point where the next message is sent out. Let g be
the condition that according to the speciﬁcation has to be checked between the
program points p and q. Then the tool veriﬁes that the condition g is enforced by
the program between the execution points p and q. To verify this, our tool inspects
the conditionals and exceptions between p and q to ﬁnd out whether g is enforced,
based on a control ﬂow analysis using control ﬂow graphs, where all paths between
the nodes representing the program points p and q have to be examined to see
whether they enforce g. As an example, we consider the guard g = ver(certS) that
is performed by the client according to the speciﬁcation in Fig. 6. We explain in
detail how our tool automatically veriﬁes that the Jessie implementation correctly
enforces this guard. The tool makes use of the control ﬂow graph which can be
generated from the source code using tools available for this purpose (in our case
using the tool CodeLogic) and which is visualized in Fig. 12.
According to the annotations deﬁned based on the textual speciﬁcations, the
check g is implemented by the method call session.trustManager.
checkServerTrusted(peerCerts, suite.getAuthType()) (which throws an exception if the
check fails). By tracking the various write and read calls, the tool also determines
where the program points p resp. q are located, where the last message is received
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Fig. 12. Control Flow Graph for Verifying checkServerTrusted
resp. the next message is sent out. In this case, the last message before the guard
should be checked is received using the command msg =
Handshake.read(din, certType) at the program point marked p in Fig. 12. This cor-
responds to the point where the message Certiﬁcate(X509CertS) is received at the
Client side in the sequence diagram in Fig. 6. The next message after the guard
should be checked is sent out using the command msg.write(dout, version) at the
program point q in Fig. 12. This corresponds to the point where the message
ClientKeyExchange(encKS (PMS)) is sent at the Client side in the sequence diagram
in Fig. 6. Thus the tool has to check that for each execution of the program, the
method call session.trustManager.checkServerTrusted(peerCerts,suite.getAuthType()
will be executed between the program points p and q. The tool proves this for-
mally by making use of program reasoning rules. Informally, in this simple example
one can see that this is indeed the case by inspecting the control ﬂow graph in
Fig. 12, where one can see that there is no path from p to q except the one where g
is checked, since the jump into the catch-block leads to a termination of the program.
We then veriﬁed the abstracted control ﬂow graph against the relevant security
requirements such as secrecy and authenticity using our tools. In each case, the
properties were proved within less than a minute. For example, the veriﬁcation of
the secrecy of the master secret communicated in the SSL protocol took 2 seconds
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and was achieved by the eprover contained in the e-SETHEO suite.
4 The Java Secure Sockets Extension (JSSE)
Having studied one implementation of the cryptographic protocol in Jessie 1.0.1, we
aim at reusing our veriﬁcation work in the reference implementation of the same pro-
tocol in Jsse, which is a library in the standard JDK since version 1.4. Fortunately,
Sun has released the JDK 1.6+ implementation as an open-source project called
OpenJDK. The source code of the latest Jsse library can be checked out from the fol-
lowing Subversion repository: https://openjdk.dev.java.net/source/browse/openjdk/
jdk/trunk/jdk/src/share/classes/sun/security/ssl. To assess transferability of our re-
sults from Jessie to JSSE, we have compared Jessie with Jsse for their imple-
mentations of the handshake protocol. Although implemented diﬀerently in Jsse,
we were able to determine the corresponding implementations for all the symbols
in our model of the handshake protocol. The doHandshake protocol is mainly im-
plemented in the class org.metastatic.jessie.provider.SSLSocket of the Jessie 1.0.1
library, whereas in the Jsse library in the OpenJDK 1.6 the protocol is mainly im-
plemented in the class sun.security.ssl.HandshakeMessage. Nevertheless, the naming
of the symbols can be traced into the implementation. We plan to exploit these
similarities in future work on verifying the Jsse library.
5 Conclusion
We presented the details about an application of automated theorem provers for
ﬁrst order logic in an approach to verify the open-source Java implementation Jessie
of the SSL protocol. We also explained how to transfer the results to the newly
open-sourced JSSE library.
Although our approach is not completely automatic and requires some eﬀort for
inserting the assertions into the source code, it turned out to be applicable with
reasonable eﬀort even in software projects in industrial use, as demonstrated at the
hand of the JSSE implementation. We are planning to make the approach more
automatic using a pattern recognition approach for recurring functionality such as
sending and receiving messages.
Future work includes plans to investigate the use of compositional veriﬁcation
techniques based on algorithmic game semantics [3,5].
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